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It is argued that innovation policy based on notions of market failure or system failure is too limited in the context of current 
societal challenges. I propose a third, complexity-theoretic approach. This approach starts from the observation that most 
innovations are related to existing activities, and that policy’s additionality is highest for unrelated diversification. To trigger 
unrelated diversification into activities that contribute to solving societal challenges, government’s main task is to organize 
the process of demand articulation. This process leads to clear and manageable societal objectives that effectively guide a 
temporary collation of actors to develop solutions bottom-up. The combination of a broad coalition, a clear objective and 
tentative governance are the means to cope with the inherent complexity of modern-day innovation.  
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1. Introduction
With the fall of Keynesianism in the 1980s and the rise in global competition in the 1990s, 
innovation policy has become the cornerstone of economic policy in every high-income country or 
region. Indeed, since Solow’s (1957) seminal study, ample empirical evidence has been collected 
showing that innovation accounts for a large part of economic growth. By stimulating innovation 
in firms, governments hope to increase productivity, employment growth and prosperity. Though 
the main objectives of innovation policy may be widely shared politically, the understanding of 
innovation processes in the economy, and how these can be influenced by policy, is ill-
understood. 
In this essay, I will first summarize the two dominant perspectives on innovation policy (the 
market-failure approach and system-failure approach), and I will then develop a more historical 
perspective based on complexity theory. While the complexity-theoretical perspective incorporates 
key elements from the two existing paradigms, it opens up a new perspective in which 
institutions are seen as co-evolving with radical innovation, rather than simply enabling 
incremental innovation processes. Using this framework, we critically assess Mazzucato’s (2013) 
notion of the ‘Entrepreneurial State’ and end with a plea for a more bottom-up, challenge-led 
innovation policy. 
2. Market failure
Academic thinking about innovation, and innovation policy, has long been dominated by the 
economics profession. From the perspective of mainstream economy theory, innovation – defined 
here as the successful introduction of new products, services and production processes – can be 
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viewed as a knowledge production activity. Similar to any kind of production activity, inputs are 
transformed into output where inputs are mainly knowledge and research equipment and output 
are new products and production processes. This linear view on innovation is well suited for 
econometric analysis once inputs are proxied by R&D expenditures and outputs by patents. Using 
such a ‘knowledge-production-function’, one can measure the return to R&D investments at 
regional or national levels as well as the extent to which regions/countries benefit from R&D 
invested by other regions/countries, otherwise known as spillovers. 
From the perspective of the linear model, the economic question holds whether the R&D 
investments is below the socially optimal level. Theoretically, it can be expected that firms under-
invest in R&D because part of their outputs of their investments spillover to other firms, who 
imitate innovation without remunerating the originator, a case of market failure (Arrow, 1962). 
This is especially the case in industries where innovations cannot be patented. Hence, the 
conditions that allow firms to appropriate the returns form their R&D investment are important. 
A second reason why firms may under-invest related to the inherent uncertainty, in the Knightian 
sense, of the outcomes of R&D investments. In many cases, firms cannot foresee at all whether 
R&D investment will lead to a successful innovation. Consequently, firms will find it difficult to 
raise funding. These theoretical arguments provide a clear policy rationale for R&D subsidies for 
firms as well as for universities, and for tight patent protection. Indeed, if firms invest less in 
R&D than that would be socially desirable, R&D subsidies and strengthening patent protection 
are standard ways to repair such market failures. 
For long, R&D subsidies – mainly in the form of R&D tax incentives such as wage subsidies 
for R&D personal and lower profit tax for R&D performing firms – were uncontroversial given the 
strong theoretical support from economics and the strong political support from left to right given 
their shared objectives in promoting growth and employment. However, the more recent insights 
cast some doubts about R&D subsidies. First, the effect of R&D subsidies on private R&D 
investments is rather small. At the micro-level, a meta-study found that the elasticity is 0.21 
meaning that if subsidies reduce the cost of R&D by 1 percent, firms only invest 0.21 percent 
more in R&D (Gaillard-Ladinska, et al., 2015). There is also some evidence that this effect is even 
lower for larger firms. At the macro-level, there is no relation between a country’s innovativeness 
and the share of government support to R&D that is allocated via R&D tax incentives (Gaillard-
Ladinska & Straathof, 2015). Furthermore, it may matter a lot how innovation is defined in the 
context of R&D subsidies. Some countries subsidize any R&D activity including innovations that 
are new-to-the-firm but have already been developed elsewhere, while others are more restricted 
and subsidize only firms who develop innovation that are new-to-the-country and new-to-the-
world. In the former case, R&D subsidies may actually discourage true innovations to some 
extent, as governments subsidize firms to imitate innovations of others. In all, this suggests that 
restricting R&D tax incentives to smaller firms that developed new-to-the-world innovations 
would be most effective. 
A second critique to the market-failure rationale for innovation policy focuses on the patent 
system. As stressed by Boldrin and Levine (2013), there exists a ‘patent puzzle’: in spite of the 
enormous increase in the number of patens and the strength of their legal protection from the 
1990s onwards, productivity growth has slowed down in almost all high-income counties in the 
same period. This suggests that patents may do as much good as they do harm. For example, 
many technologies that are patented are not exploited commercially; rather, these are patented to 
prevent competitors to enter into particular innovation paths. Furthermore, as a piece of 
knowledge can be both an output of one firm’s R&D process and an input of another firm’s R&D 
process later on, tight patent protection may block promising innovations, especially of the 
recombinant type. More generally, the importance of patents in stimulating innovation is should 
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not be overstated, because firms dispose of other strategies as well to protect their innovations, 
including secrecy, branding and being first to the market (Arundel, 2001; Cohen, et al., 2002). 
3. System failure
A second influential approach in innovation policy starts from the notion of a national 
innovation system. Freeman was first to introduce this concept, and defined it as “the network of 
institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, 
modify and diffuse new technologies” (Freeman, 1987, p. 1), where the word institutions here 
refers to actors such as firms, universities, financial organizations, public research organizations, 
government, consumer organizations, etc.. The concept of the ‘triple helix’ of university-industry-
government relations proposed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) also stressed the benefits of 
collaboration and coordination between actors. Both notions of innovation system and triple helix 
stemmed from the recognition that many innovation processes involve a multitude of actors who 
each contribute and jointly collaborate to the shaping and success of new technologies and 
services. In this more holistic perspective, the functioning of an innovation system can thus be 
assessed by looking for system failures in analogy to market failures. Such failures may refer to 
underdeveloped actors within the innovation system or underdeveloped linkages between actors 
that make up the innovation system (Klein Woolthuis, et al., 2005, p. 611). 
The notion of system failure was already implicit in policy circles in the mid-1990s when the 
‘European Paradox’ was identified, which came to dominate European innovation policy thinking 
for at least 15 years. This paradox was formulated as: “Compared with the scientific performance 
of its principal competitors, that of the EU is excellent, but over the last fifteen years its 
technological and commercial performance in high-technology sectors such as electronics and 
information technologies has deteriorated.” (European Commission, 1995, p. 5). The key to 
solving the paradox was to increase the interaction between the key actors in the innovation, 
identified as firms, universities and, to a lesser extent, financial organizations. This observation 
was the more important because it ran against the linear model – dominant at the time – because 
the paradox indicates that inputs, such as a strong scientific knowledge base, does not 
automatically leads to outputs, such as competitive advantage in new industries. 
The notion of the European paradox, and in particular its emphasis on the need to 
strengthen the commercialization of university research, was later questioned by Dosi et al. (2006) 
and Bonaccorsi (2008), who provided evidence that the loss in technological strength of Europe 
compared to the U.S. is not due to the insufficient translation of otherwise excellent scientific 
research, but to the lack of excellent research as such. Indeed, the U.S. does not only excel 
technologically but also scientifically. This claim was further confirmed by Lissoni et al. (2008) 
who showed, contrary to common belief, that European university professors are almost as active 
as their American counterparts in translating their research into patents, albeit through other 
institutional channels. Where in the U.S. many patents on findings from public research are 
taken by universities, in Europe these tend to be taken by firms as measured by authorship of 
university professors on firm patents. This is part of the evidence that Europe’s relative lack of 
innovation compared to the U.S. may not be due to insufficient translation of scientific knowledge 
into innovation, but rather in producing top science in the first place. 
This perspective has been echoed more recently by Mazzucato (2013) who emphasized that 
the innovation success of the U.S. lies much more in patient government funding for mission-
oriented research, especially in the health and military domains, than in anything else. The long-
term commitment of U.S. government to particular areas in science and technology, allows for 
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risky endeavors in large research programs. She pleas for a more proactive innovation policy 
where government provides visions and commits long-term resources for particular technologies, 
for example, in stimulating nanotechnology or green energy technologies. However, it remains 
unclear whether policies that are effective in U.S. with a well-integrated internal market, top 
private universities and a large military sector, will be equally effective in European countries 
where such conditions are not met. 
The debate about the European Paradox illustrates that the innovation system concept 
provides a useful policy frame to go beyond market failure reasoning alone, but also that the 
concept remains theoretically underdeveloped and, hence, lack explanatory power. In a 
fundamental sense, the theoretical weakness of the innovation system notion is inherent to its 
static perspective. National differences in the nature (product, process) and rate (more or less) of 
innovation are attributed to rather sketchy macroscopic descriptions without a theoretical model 
how generic institutions – here meaning the rules and laws guiding interactions between actors – 
would govern collaborative innovation processes. Instead, historical case studies tend to show that 
a major part of innovation process – especially concerning the more radical types – concerns the 
intentional efforts to change and adapt institutions in ways supportive of particular innovations. 
Put simply, institutions should be thought of not only as an independent variable, but also as 
dependent variable. That is, institutions ‘co-evolve’ with technical change and market conditions 
(Van den Belt & Rip, 1987; Nelson, 1995; Murmann, 2003).1  
4. A complexity-theoretic perspective
In recent years, a third perspective on innovation policy is emerging that has its roots in 
evolutionary economics, and links to complexity theory in two fundamental ways. First, it 
advocates a different notion of knowledge than the ones underlying market-failure and system-
failure approaches. Second, it conceives of a complex and country-specific space of opportunities 
and barriers for innovation. Combining these insights, one can argue that the additionality of any 
innovation policy is not just uncertain but likely to be low, with the exception of innovation policy 
for societal challenges.  
Let us start by recalling the theories of knowledge underlying contemporary innovation 
policies. In the market and system failure perspectives, such a theory of knowledge remains 
rather implicit. In the neoclassical framework underlying the market-failure arguments, the 
notion of knowledge is primarily one of codified knowledge. Indeed, if knowledge is codified, it 
can easily spillover to competing firms. Writing this knowledge down into a legal document such 
as a patent, would then be in principle an effective instrument to protect new knowledge. The 
innovation-system framework underlying the system failure argument has a more subtle notion 
of knowledge. First, it is recognized that knowledge is distributed among many actors that all may 
contribute critically to innovation processes. Second, it is also recognized that a lot of knowledge 
relevant to innovation is tacit in nature and resides in people in the form of experience knowledge 
as well as organizations in the form of organizational capabilities. Hence, to combine tacit 
knowledge in people and organizations with other people and organizations, collaboration within 
and across organizations is key as well as stable institutions such as laws, norms and public 
policies to support such collaborations. 
The evolutionary perspective, and later its complexity-theoretic elaboration, follows the 
innovation-system framework in its view of knowledge as distributed and consisting of tacit and 
codified knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Where it differs from the innovation-system 
approach, however, is that it views innovation primarily as a process where cognitive distances 
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between individuals are to overcome rather than institutional distances between organizations 
within an innovation system. Cognitive distances are most easily overcome if individuals have 
related knowledge base, for example, work in the same or technologically related industries as 
well as if individuals share the same norms and values (Nooteboom, 2000; Frenken, et al., 2007). 
By associating and recombining pieces of knowledge and technology in new ways, new products 
and services are being conceived that may, or may not, be successful. Collaboration central to the 
innovation-system perspective is one way of overcoming such cognitive distances, but this can 
also be done in other ways. For example, some individual firms or entrepreneurs are perfectly 
capable of re-combining on their own, while in other context recombination critically hinges on 
collaboration and collaboration within the innovation system. Furthermore, informal social 
networks as these exist in (on-line) communities of practices often crossing national boundaries, 
can be very effective in organizing innovation as well. 
The central mechanism in the growth of knowledge is to recombine existing artefacts, 
knowledge and capabilities in new and more complicated ways (Arthur, 2009). Following this, a 
complexity-theoretic perspective emphasizes that, first and foremost, innovation patterns are 
highly cumulative and path dependent. Although the notions of cumulativeness and path 
dependence go back to the 1980s (Dosi, 1982; David, 1985), systematic evidence on how national 
and regional growth trajectories are constrained by the past, is only of recent date. In particular, 
Hidalgo et al. (2007) were able to show that countries develop their economy by diversifying into 
export products that are closely related to products they already export. That is, if a country mainly 
exports shoes and trousers, it is very likely to diversify into related goods (e.g. shirts or socks) 
rather than into unrelated goods (e.g. toys or televisions). This strongly path dependent nature of 
diversification in national economic development as shown by Hidalgo et al. (2007) also holds 
true empirically at the sub-national levels (Neffke, et al., 2011; Boschma, et al., 2013) and equally 
so for technological and scientific development as measured by patents (Kogler, et al., 2013; 
Tavassoli & Carbonara, 2014; Rigby, 2015; Tanner, 2015) and publications (Boschma, et al., 2014; 
Heimeriks & Balland, 2015). 
If we think of products as being more or less related, and that this greatly affects the 
opportunities for countries to diversify and develop, the structure of the ‘product space’ and a 
country’s position in it, matters. The relatedness of products in the product space can be mapped 
in various mays, for example by counting how many countries are specialized in the same two 
products or how many people change jobs between two product industries. Whatever method is 
used, the resulting product space can be thought of as a network with links between related 
products (Hidalgo, et al., 2007). Such a network is fundamentally ‘complex’ meaning that some 
products are very central (i.e. related to many other products) while other are more peripheral (i.e. 
related to only few products). Furthermore, there are modules of products that are interrelated but 
rather unrelated to all other products. Relatedness can even be thought of as asymmetric: it may 
be easier to diversify from product A into product B, than vice versa (e.g. diversification from 
airplanes into cars is easier than from cars into airplanes). Given the complex nature of the 
product space, countries located in the center and have ample diversification opportunities while 
other may be located at the periphery or being locked in into a module.  
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Figure 1 : An example of the product space.   [Source: http://www.chidalgo.com/productspace/network.htm] 
Product relatedness is strongly predictive: the chances that a country starts exporting a 
product closely related to existing products in a country’s portfolio are much higher than the 
chances that a country diversifies in more distant products.  The interpretation of this 
evolutionary pattern holds that once a country has developed the capabilities to export particular 
products, it can easily diversify in related products that require very similar capabilities to produce 
them. In basic economic terms, the reasoning here is one of economies of scope: diversification 
into related products allows a country to exploit the knowledge it already has, while diversification 
into unrelated products would necessitate a country to invest heavily as to acquire new knowledge. 
It is therefore not surprising that the empirical research just cited showed that most countries and 
regions have developed new activities closely to existing activities. This is not only a likely pattern 
but also a sensible pattern, as regions and countries can leverage the knowledge and 
competencies already present. 
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The innovation policy implications of a complexity-theoretic framework are not necessarily in 
conflict with those motivated by market failures and system failures. Indeed, a related-
diversification strategy can be supported by generic R&D subsidies, as well as by strong 
collaboration within a country’s innovation system. In the case of generic R&D subsidies, those 
trying to explore new activities are compensated for the risk they take as well as the spillovers they 
are likely to generate for other firms. Firms receiving such subsidies are existing firms producing 
products making use of an existing knowledge base, and can thus be expected to diversify in 
closely related products. Similarly, system failure policies will strengthen interactions between 
existing actors who build on existing strengths within an innovation system. Thus, a government 
pursuing market and system failure policies, will almost automatically promote related rather 
than unrelated diversification. Thus, although the outcome is predictable, generic policies do not 
have to pre-specify this direction and thus have the advantage that the information problem 
(which technology to choose) is circumvented. 
However, there are two fundamental weaknesses of market and system failures policies from 
a complexity perspective. First of all, though the market and system failure policies are in essence 
generic, large firms benefit more than small firms, as large firms do on average more R&D and 
have formal R&D departments to which tax benefits apply. Similarly, manufacturing will profit 
more than services, as the latter has little formal R&D activities and hence typically fall outside the 
scope of R&D subsidies. Hence, generic R&D subsidies are most likely to reinforce existing 
manufacturing specializations dominated by large firms. In the case of policies geared to repair 
system failures, again larger firms will profit most, as they are better embedded in innovation 
system and can bear the sunk costs involved in participating in such systems. Furthermore, with 
much emphasis on improving university-industry relations, science-based sectors (mainly high-
tech manufacturing) are privileged over creative industries and service sectors, though demand as 
well as employment is much higher in the latter sectors than in the former. Though R&D 
activities coordinated within an innovation system may well lead to true new innovations, most 
likely these innovations will be closely related to existing strengths of incumbents in such a 
system, simply because innovation systems are built up by incumbent actors largely setting 
agenda’s on their own. Put differently, a government pursuing solely market and system failure 
policies will generally de facto lead to a stimulus for large manufacturing firms to diversify into 
related industries. Innovation policy, thus, de facto is rather directed towards certain actors and 
sectors, rather than truly generic including startups and small firms and including creative 
industries and service sectors. This also explains the poor additionality of such innovation 
policies. Large manufacturing firms have both the resources, appropriability conditions and 
organizational capabilities to set-up innovation programs on their own, and with relevant partners 
within the innovation system. And since market- and system-failure policies will mainly lead to 
diversification into related products, the inherent risks associated with R&D are actually quite low, 
which suggests that most innovations would also been pursued in the absence of these policies.  
A second fundamental weakness of market and system failures policies holds that a country 
that continues to develop only by diversifying into related activities runs a serious risk of running 
out of opportunities. It will become increasingly harder to find related activities to exploit, the 
more related activities have already been explored in the past (Saviotti & Frenken, 2008). Hence, a 
related diversification strategy should go hand in hand with an unrelated-diversification strategy as 
well. In other contexts, one also speaks of the exploration versus exploitation and the need for 
‘ambidexterity’. 
If the objective of innovation policy is to help actors diversify into unrelated activities, market 
and system failures arguments still remain relevant. On the one hand, the market failure 
argument applies a fortiori given that the risk involved in unrelated diversification is much higher 
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compared to related diversification. That is, actors (firms, consumers, universities, financial 
institutions) will be even more reluctant to invest in unrelated activities than in related activities, 
which would imply that R&D subsidies have a stronger rationale in an unrelated diversification 
policy than in a related diversification policy. However, this risk only applies to a small subset of 
firms that actually pursue such a strategy, so one would have to abandon a generic R&D subsidy 
logic (Rodrik, 2004). In practice, however, an agency granting R&D subsidies would have a hard 
time to assess which firms pursues an unrelated or related R&D strategy. 
For unrelated diversification, the system failure argument also holds a fortiori because it is 
precisely when innovations deviate from existing knowledge, institutions and user practices, that 
new institutions have to be built. In a sense, one can say that a new technology-specific innovation 
system has to be built more or less from scratch (Hekkert, et al., 2007; Bergek, et al., 2008). 
However, an unrelated-diversification strategy calls for a different systemic policy than the one 
that is usually advocated. A policy is needed that aims to change institutions which generally 
requires involving new actors as well as risk-taking on the part of government itself, rather than to 
reinforcing existing actor positions, institutional arrangements and government roles. Such a 
policy is difficult, as (parts of) governments may have their own stakes in continuing existing 
institutional arrangements or be subject to strong lobbies by incumbent actors, and are generally 
reluctant to experiment with new rules and regulations. One way to allow for more 
experimentation then would be to decentralize innovation policy and powers to cities and regions, 
so that a larger variety of new techno-institutional arrangements can be built and evaluated.2
Another one would be to create new institutional spaces by socio-technical experiments or 
introducing the ‘right to challenge’ existing rules by actors who meet public interests by 
alternative means (European Council, 2016). Yet another way is to invest more resources into 
learning how to transplant successful institutional arrangements from one territory to another, or 
from one sector to another, or from one technology to another (Binz, et al., 2014; Dawley, 2014). 
Since any economy will benefit in the long run from a mix of related and unrelated 
diversification, the difficult challenge for governments is to come up with market and system 
failure policies that on the hand support existing companies and sectors in their quest for the 
exploitation of their existing competencies in related activities, while on the other hand support 
those few who wish to break with establish practices and explore more risky paths of potentially 
much bigger social returns. In stimulating related diversification, the state can rely on generic 
policies, while in stimulating unrelated diversification, the state has to focus much more on 
specific policies.  
Though generic and specific market-failure policies may be rather easily combined – for 
example, by granting all firms doing R&D a (small) generic subsidy, and firms with a very risky 
investment specific financial support through an investment fund so that potential returns feed 
back into state finances – the inherent contradictions between related and unrelated 
diversification systemic policies are harder to solve. A well-functioning innovation system – in the 
sense of strong coordination and consensus on R&D activities among major actors – is probably 
also a system that is more reluctant to change the institutions and accept radical innovations that 
potentially threaten the competitive strength of incumbents. Innovation systems that are capable 
of providing a continuous stream of incremental innovations with firms as active agenda-setting 
actors and universities as responsive knowledge providers, is obviously not a system where 
radically new agenda’s  will spontaneously emerge advocating to break with past specializations 
and to diversify into new and unrelated territories. A further problem for any unrelated-
diversification policy is how to make an informed choice and politically defend specific priorities 
given that so many other priorities can be chosen. By contrast, a related-diversification policy does 
not face these problems as opportunities emerge endogenously in a path dependent manner and 
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political support is almost automatic given that vested interests can perfectly seize the 
opportunities of related diversification. 
5. Societal challenges
Our previous discussion makes clear the rationale for innovation policy is greatest in 
contexts of unrelated diversification. At the same time, the direction of unrelated diversification is 
by nature undefined. The notion of cross-specialization introduced by Janssen (2015) is a first 
attempt to solve this apparent contradiction. He advocates an innovation policy aimed at radical 
innovation by promoting crossovers between unrelated technologies or industries already present 
in an economy (Castaldi, et al., 2015). In this way, one can still build on existing artefacts, 
knowledge, and capabilities residing in an economy while explicitly aiming to new a very new 
specialization. Such true ‘New Combinations’, if successful, may provide a long-term source of 
competitiveness as other countries that do not share the same specialized knowledge fields being 
recombined, will find it hard to copy such a success. And given that such a policy still continues to 
build on an economy’s strongholds, but in a radically new combinations, one expect political 
support for such policies to exist. 
A second way to guide radical innovation and unrelated diversification is to move away from 
existing capabilities viz. interest at the supply-side at the starting point, and alternatively to 
articulate new needs at the demand side (Boon & Edler, 2015). The current frame within which 
such demand-led innovation policies are being discussed, is the European-Commission frame of 
‘societal challenges’ such as climate change, air quality, sustainable food, aging, smart mobility, 
Internet crime, alienation, obesity, diabetes, analphabetism,  mental health, et cetera. There are 
many missing markets related to these challenges due to the fact that most societal challenges 
stem from negative externalities or a public-good nature of the problem. Demand articulation 
does not only increases the chances of innovation being accepted and embraced by user publics, it 
also provides legitimacy and guidance for the innovation process itself.  
In line with this reasoning, Weber and Rohracher (2012) mentioned legitimacy, guidance 
and demand articulation as key ‘transformation failures’, in analogy to market and system 
failures. In the context of the need for transformation given societal challenges, market and 
system failure policies lose some of their rationale. These generic policies will have little 
additionality in solving societal challenges for three reasons. First, it is unlikely that generic 
policies miraculously lead to solutions for specific societal challenges. Second, as the markets 
associated with societal challenges are either imperfect or completely missing, firms find it 
difficult and highly risky to try to serve these markets in the first place, as it is uncertain if, and if 
so how, future markets for such problem will be institutionalized. And, finally, the societal 
challenges are new, ‘grand’ and complex. Hence, solutions will be to a large extent unrelated to 
technologies and institutions already existing. Given our earlier conclusion that generic policies 
will foster mainly related diversification, it is unlikely to trigger the more radical innovations 
required to solve these challenges. Calls for what Mazzucato (2013) called a more ‘entrepreneurial 
state’ seem indeed justified, given both the urgency and uncertainty of societal challenges. 
In the context of societal challenges, it is particularly insightful to recall an old text by Nelson 
(1974) who asked the simple question: “if we can land a man on the moon, why can’t we solve the 
problems of the ghetto?” Nelson stressed that the challenge of putting a man of the moon was 
very different from that of solving problems in ghetto’s or, for that matter, most other societal 
challenges including climate change, ageing, depression, malaria, floods, congestion, pollution, 
human trafficking, Internet fraud, and so on. The objective to land a man on the moon was well-
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defined and guided technological and scientific research in a clear direction. Moreover, the 
objective (at the time) was broadly supported by the public. Through dedicated and specific 
investments in Research and Development, the challenge could be met. However, ghetto-like 
problems are wicked and ill-defined, and how such problems should be defined is even contested 
(Bijker, et al., 1987). Furthermore, any progress in solving such problems is hard to monitor 
rendering experimental intervention and ex post policy evaluation difficult. Finally, ghetto-
problems are multi-faceted and mainly result from behavioral and social processes that are hard 
to understand, let alone, to influence by policy. 
Given that most societal challenges are clearly ghetto-type problems, Mazzucato’s (2013) call 
for massive public investment in particular sciences and technologies, or in public enterprises, is 
questionable. Only in some cases can societal challenges be easily translated in clear technological 
projects with the government as a strong driver. Such exceptions include for example battery 
technology, drugs for rare diseases, or public infrastructures to protect citizens against flooding. 
However, most of the problems that can be subsumed under societal challenges will not be solved 
by technological fixes nor by advances in scientific research or state-led policies. Rather, a new 
wave of innovation policies is needed that starts from those parts of society where the challenge is 
actually present and partial knowledge about it is available, and then translates such a challenge 
into a well-defined and politically supported problem (Boon, et al., 2011). Only then, a ‘temporary 
innovation system’ can be organized effectively, which is dedicated to solving such a problem by 
addressing both the economic, technological and institutional dimensions of the problem at 
hand.3 
The elaboration of a societal challenge into a concrete innovation objective and policy is a key 
process. Without a concretization of a ‘ghetto-like’ challenge, the problem remains elusive hereby 
de facto de-politicizing the challenge. By making a challenge operational by formulating a clear 
objective, the choice for supporting one or another innovation policy objective is made part of a 
normative process. At the same time, once such a simple objective has been formulates, (absence 
of) progress can easily be monitored ensuring politicians’ accountability. Examples of such 
objectives are zero deaths in traffic, no homeless sleeping on the streets, no children with obesity, 
all vehicles zero-emission, et cetera. In this search process, finding an operational objective that 
finds supports from diverse political parties (often for different reasons) would nevertheless be 
preferable, because a challenge-led policy is often taking 5-10 years and should be able to survive 
changes of government. By agreeing on a concrete objective, a temporary innovation can be 
legitimately organized as the relevant stakeholders can only be identified as a challenge is further 
specific into a concrete objective. At the same time, the objective sets an agenda – or an 
‘innovation trajectory’ if you will – for stakeholders to jointly pursue and a yardstick for evaluation 
and learning during the innovation process. In this way, a shared and concrete objective greatly 
reduces the inherent cognitive complexity stemming from the ghetto-type nature of societal 
challenge as well as the organizational complexity stemming from the distributed nature of 
expertise among stakeholders. 
The formulation of a clear objective mobilises existing organisations to work together in 
findings ways to meet it, through collaboration and coordination of actions fitting in their 
respective roles and competence. In this context, Kuhlmann and Rip (2014) speak of tentative 
governance rather than working from a master plan. That is, the objective is there but the way(s) 
to achieve is an emergent outcome. A temporary innovation system thus cuts across existing, 
more institutionalised innovation at sectoral, technological and territorial levels. Given the a 
single guiding objective and its temporary nature, there is no need to institutionalise the 
temporary innovation system itself, avoiding possible clashes between already existing 
institutional logics, sunk investments and interests. Yet, if particular solutions that emerge from 
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temporary innovation systems are successful, the solutions can effectively become adopted in 
existing institutional frameworks and may also be the basis as a new export product to countries 
dealing with similar challenges (Dewald & Fromhold-Eisebith, 2015). 
Finally, note that temporary innovation systems can take many forms, including urban 
innovation programs, sectoral voluntary agreements, monitoring and labelling instruments, social 
enterprises, government Task Forces, citizen movements, online communities, et cetera. The 
plurality of governance structures is unavoidable and probably necessary, given the variety of 
technological, institutional and political contexts in which such ‘pop-up’ innovation systems 
emerge. In some arrangements, governments can take the lead and be directive and financially 
supportive, while in other contexts the absence of government (and possibly even lack of law 
enforcement) is most productive.  
6. Concluding remarks
In this essay, I have summarized market-failure and system-failure arguments that 
constitute the dominant frames in current innovation policy. Next, I have proposed a third 
complexity-theoretic perspective stressing the path dependence of economic development 
resulting from the tendency to diversity into related rather than unrelated activities. As a 
consequence, I formulated the need for unrelated diversification policies, especially in light of the 
grand challenges that societies are facing today. I ended by concluding that given the inherent 
complex, contested and behavioral nature of societal challenges, a return to technology-push 
strategies in the tradition of ‘man-on-the-moon’ projects is undesirable except in rare cases. 
Instead, I suggested to translate challenges into concrete objectives and then to build dedicated 
‘temporary innovation systems’. 
For innovation scholars, then, the research challenge regarding temporary innovation 
systems will be twofold. First, we will have to understand why certain governance structures 
emerge in certain contexts, and what renders them effective and durable in their intended 
outcomes. This links to the broader question of how institutions change which is taken up inter 
alia in the institutional-sociology literature under the label of institutional entrepreneurship 
(Battilana, et al., 2009). Second, we may have to transform current innovation systems into ‘meta’ 
innovation systems that facilitate the setting up of temporary innovation systems including 
ambitious societal objectives as well as effective structures to diffuse contextualized solutions 
across territories and sectors. This links to the broader political-science question of policy learning 
and institutional transplantation. For both questions, it holds that innovation studies as a field has 
to loosen its traditional prime focus on the economics discipline and has to open up much more 
to the fields of institutional sociology and political science. 
Acknowledgements: 
The author wishes thank Wouter Boon, Matthijs Janssen and Bernhard Truffer for 
comments. The usual caveat applies. This work has been funded under NWO’s VICI program. 
References 
Arrow, K. J. (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, in: R.R. Nelson (ed.) The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Complexity, Governance & Networks (2017) - Special Issue: Complexity, Innovation and Policy (2017) 35-47
46 Koen Frenken: A Complexity-Theoretic Perspective on Innovation Policy 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-41 
University of Bamberg Press 
Arthur, W.B. (2009). The Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves. New York: Free Press. 
Arundel, A. (2001). The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation. Research Policy 30(4): 611–624. 
Battilana, J., Leca, B. & Boxenbaum, E. (2009). How actors change institutions: Towards a theory of institutional 
entrepreneurship. The Academy of Management Annals 3: 65–107.  
Bergek, A., Jacobsson, S., Carlsson, B., Lindmark, S., & Rickne, A. (2008). Analyzing the functional dynamics of 
technological innovation systems: A scheme of analysis. Research Policy 37: 407–429. 
Bijker, W.E., Hughes, T.P., & Pinch, T.J. (1987). The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the 
Sociology and History of Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Binz, C., Truffer, B., & Coenen, L. (2014). Why space matters in technological innovation systems - Mapping global 
knowledge dynamics of membrane bioreactor technology. Research Policy 43(1): 138–155. 
Boldrin, M., & Levine, D.K. (2013). The case against patents. Journal of Economic Perspectives 27: 3–22. 
Bonaccorsi, A. (2008). Explaining poor performance of European science: institutions versus policies. Science and Public 
Policy 34: 303–316. 
Boon, W., & Edler, J. (2015). The missing links – demand based policy making and instruments in the context of mission 
orientation: Concepts, impacts, governance challenges. Paper presented at the Annual Eu-SPRI conference, Helsinki. 
Boon, W. P., Moors, E.H., Kuhlmann, S., & Smits, R.E. (2011). Demand articulation in emerging technologies: Intermediary 
user organisations as co-producers? Research Policy 40(2), 242–252. 
Boschma, R., Heimeriks, G., & Balland, P.A. (2014). Scientific knowledge dynamics and relatedness in bio-tech 
cities.  Research Policy 43: 107–114.  
Boschma, R., Minondo, A., & Navarro, M. (2013). The emergence of new industries at the regional level in Spain. A 
proximity approach based on product-relatedness. Economic Geography 89: 29–51. 
Castaldi, C., Frenken, K., & Los, B. (2015). Related variety, unrelated variety and technological breakthroughs. An analysis 
of US state-level patenting. Regional Studies 49: 767–781. 
Cohen, W. M., Goto, A., Nagata, A., Nelson, R. R., & Walsh, J. P. (2002). R&D spillovers, patents and the incentives to 
innovate in Japan and the United States. Research Policy 31(8): 1349–1367. 
David, P. (1985). Clio and the economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review Proceedings 75: 332–337. 
Dawley S. (2014). Creating new paths? Offshore wind, policy activism, and peripheral region development. Economic 
Geography 90(1), 91–112. 
Dewald, U., & Fromhold-Eisebith, M. (2015). Trajectories of sustainability transitions in scale-transcending innovation 
systems: The case of photovoltaics. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 17: 110-125. 
Dewald, U., & Truffer, B. (2012). The local sources of market formation: Explaining regional growth differentials in German 
photovoltaic markets. European Planning Studies 20: 397-420. 
Dosi, G. (1982). Technological paradigms and technological trajectories: a suggested interpretation of the determinants and 
directions of technical change. Research Policy 11: 147–162. 
Dosi, G., Llerena, P., & Labini, M.S. (2006). The relationships between science, technologies and their industrial 
exploitation: An illustration through the myths and realities of the so-called 'European Paradox'. Research Policy 35: 
1450–1464. 
Etzkowitz, H., & Leydesdorff, L. (2000). The dynamics of innovation: From national systems and "Mode 2" to a Triple Helix 
of university-industry-government relations. Research Policy 29: 109–123. 
European Commission (1995). Green Paper on Innovation, Brussels: European Commission, Directorate XIII/D (December). 
European Council (2016). Better Regulation to Strengthen Competitiveness, press release, 26 June, Brussels.  
Freeman, C. (1987). Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan. London: Pinter. 
Frenken K., Van Oort F.G., & Verburg T. (2007). Related variety, unrelated variety and regional economic growth. Regional 
Studies 41: 685–697. 
Gaillard-Ladinska, E., Non, M., & Straathof, B. (2015). More R&D with tax incentives? A meta-analysis, CPB Discussion 
Paper 309. The Hague: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. 
Gaillard-Ladinska, E. & Straathof, B. (2015). Will R&D tax incentives get Europe growing again? VoxEU 20 January 2015. 
Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). The New Production of Knowledge: 
The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies. London: Sage. 
Hall, P.A., & Soskice, D. (2001) (eds.) Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hardeman, S., Frenken, K., Nomaler, Ö., & Ter Wal, A.L.J. (2015). Characterizing and comparing innovation systems by 
different ‘modes’ of knowledge production: A proximity approach. Science and Public Policy 42(4): 530–548. 
Heimeriks, G., & Balland, P.A. (2015). How smart is specialisation? An analysis of specialisation patterns in knowledge 
production. Science and Public Policy, advance access. 
Hekkert, M.P., Suurs, R.A.A., Negro, S.O., Kuhlmann, S., & Smits, R.E.H.M. (2007). Functions of innovation systems: A 
new approach for analysing technological change. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 74: 413–432. 
Hidalgo, C.A., Klinger, B., Barabasi, A.L., & Hausmann, R. (2007). The product space and its consequences for economic 
growth. Science 317: 482–487. 
Janssen, M. (2015). Cross-specialization and structural holes: The case of the Dutch Top sectors, Papers in Evolutionary 
Economic Geography 15.19, Utrecht University. 
Complexity, Governance & Networks (2017) - Special Issue: Complexity, Innovation and Policy (2017) 35-47
47 Koen Frenken: A Complexity-Theoretic Perspective on Innovation Policy 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-41 
University of Bamberg Press 
Klein Woolthuis, R., Lankhuizen, M., & Gilsing, V. (2005). A system failure framework for innovation policy. Technovation 
25: 609–619. 
Kogler, D.F., Rigby D.L., & Tucker, I. (2013). Mapping knowledge space and technological relatedness in US 
cities. European Planning Studies 21: 1374–1391. 
Kuhlmann, S., & Rip, A. (2014). The challenge of addressing Grand Challenges, mimeo, University of Twente, January. 
Lissoni, F., Llerena, P., McKelvey, M., & Sanditov, B. (2008). Academic patenting in Europe: new evidence from the 
KEINS database. Research Evaluation 16: 87–102. 
Mazzucato, M. (2013). The Entrepreneurial State: debunking public vs. private sector myths. London UK: Anthem Press.
Murmann, J.P. (2003). Knowledge and Competitive Advantage: The Coevolution of Firms, Technology, and National 
Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Neffke F., Henning M., & Boschma, R. (2011). How do regions diversify over time? Industry relatedness and the 
development of new growth paths in regions, Economic Geography 87: 237–265. 
Nelson, R.R. (1974). Intellectualizing about the moon-ghetto metaphor: A study of the current malaise of rational analysis of 
social problems. Policy Sciences 5: 375–414. 
Nelson, R.R. (1995). Co-evolution of industry structure, technology and supporting institutions, and the making of 
comparative advantage. International Journal of the Economics of Business 2: 171–184.  
Nelson, R.R., & Winter, S.G. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press. 
Nooteboom, B. (2000). Learning and Innovation in Organizations and Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rigby, D. (2015). Technological relatedness and knowledge space: Entry and exit of US cities from patent data. Regional 
Studies 49(11), 1922–1937. 
Rodrik, D. (2004). Industrial Policy for the 21st Century, Kennedy School of Governance Working Paper 04-047, Harvard 
University. 
Saviotti, P.P., & Frenken, K. (2008). Trade variety and economic development of countries. Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics 18: 201–218.  
Solow, R.M. (1957). Technical change and the aggregate production function. Review of Economics and Statistics 39(3), 
312–320. 
Tanner, A.N. (2015). The emergence of new technology-based industries: the case of fuel cells and its technological 
relatedness to regional knowledge bases. Journal of Economic Geography, advance access. 
Tavassoli, S., & Carbonara, N. (2014). The role of knowledge variety and intensity for regional innovation. Small Business 
Economics 43(2), 493–509. 
Van den Belt, H. & Rip, A. (1987). The Nelson-Winter-Dosi model and synthetic dye chemistry, in: W. Bijker, T.P. Hughes, 
& T. Pinch, (eds.), The Social Construction of Technological Systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 135-158. 
Weber, M., & Rohracher, H. (2012). Legitimizing research, technology and innovation policies for transformative change: 
Combining insights from innovation systems and multi-level perspective in a comprehensive ‘failures’ framework. 
Research Policy 41(6): 1037–1047. 
Endnotes 
1 Compared to the national innovation system approach, the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001) is 
more grounded in the theoretical notions of institutional complementarities and dynamic capabilities. However, as for the 
national innovation system approach, this approach still has to incorporate the institutional change in the overall 
framework. 
2 In this context, the rise of solar energy technology in Germany is a case in point. The national development of the industry 
was prompted by very localized and bottom-up processes of users and housing corporation pressuring local governments 
for new policies and regulation (Dewald & Truffer, 2012). Only later, such initiatives were aggregated into national 
policies. 
3 My notion of temporary innovation system fits with an earlier knowledge of Mode 2 knowledge production, contrasting the 
traditional Mode 1 notion of independent ‘ivory tower’ university research with new notions of academic engagement, 
open innovation and temporary network organization (Gibbons, et al., 1994; Hardeman, et al., 2014). 
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